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Abstract- The scattering of nature areas in the 
Netherlands and the increased demand for nature 
lead to a governmental project in 1990 to complete a 
network of nature favouring areas, the ecological 
main structure, in 2018. The financial and economic 
costs and benefits of this project were analysed. 
Targets for purchasing of agricultural land and 
conversion into nature were adjusted several times 
as the land price doubled between 1995 and 2000. 
The purchasing rate still has to double, which will 
probably drive up the land price even further. The 
alternative is long-term contracts with farmers or 
private landowners for nature conservation. 
 
Keywords-  cost-benefit analysis; transaction costs, land 
market 
JEL classification-  G18 Government Policy and 
Regulation 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1990 the Dutch government started a nation-wide 
project for developing a network of nature favouring 
areas. This network is called the ecological main 
structure (EMS), which has the purpose of safeguarding 
the biodiversity and therewith the value of nature in the 
Netherlands. This ecological network, which should be 
completed by 2018, covers about 15% of rural area in 
the Netherlands. Although the Netherlands is a small 
country, it has nationally important biodiversity 
‘hotspots’ that require protection. Protection of 
biodiversity is considered important to society because 
biodiversity constitute the ‘web of life’ providing 
services needed to maintain health and the flexibility for 
sustaining humankind into the future. Metaphorically 
speaking, the EMS is the flagship of the most important 
nature conservation programme of the Netherlands. 
Given that the Netherlands is determined to 
develop a complete system of reserved or protected 
areas for the protection of biodiversity, a number of 
questions can be addressed. For example, since the 
policy involves the purchase of significant amounts of 
land, the question arises how land markets will be 
affected. Moreover, the Dutch government can and does 
use various institutional arrangements for managing the 
conservation of nature. These management schemes or 
institutional arrangements, including agri-environmental 
schemes (AES) as an important case, not only differ in 
terms of compensations or costs, but also involve 
different transaction costs. There the question arises 
what are the economic, financial, and transaction costs 
associated with these different management options.  
 The main aim of this paper is to analyse the 
economic and financial costs using a cost-benefit 
approach, including transaction costs of the different 
institutional arrangements used for the implementation 
of EMS. Especially attention is paid to the cost savings 
that can be obtained by adjusting the mix of institutional 
arrangements (in-house production, clubs such as nature 
conservation organisations and contracts with private 
landowners or farmers for nature conservation). Since 
some arrangements involve the purchase of significant 
amounts of land, the analysis will take into account an 
endogenized land market, an issue often ignored in 
other conservation studies (Armsworth et al, 2006).   
  Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) provides a consistent 
analytical framework to compare the economic and 
financial impacts of different institutional arrangements 
for various nature conservation policies. However, in its 
standard setting CBA usually does not include 
transaction costs. A contribution of this paper is that it 
comes up with a more comprehensive analysis, which 
both conceptually and empirically includes transaction 
costs. Little work has yet been done on the comparison 
of costs across different types of conservation 
procurement schemes, although anecdotal evidence 
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suggests transaction costs can be significant. Falconer 
and Saunders (2002: 58) focus on this issue by 
comparing different AES. Here we will look to the 
following different institutional arrangements: (1) in-
house production by the government (purchasing and 
converting agricultural land in nature and management 
by government agencies); (2) purchasing and converting 
agricultural land in nature and management by nature 
conservation organisations; (3) nature management by 
private persons; (4) nature management by farmers rural 
development policies (AES). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
discusses the methodology used, with a particular focus 
on incorporating transaction costs into CBA analysis. 
Section 3 provides a description of the EMS, the 
original target levels and recently made adjustments. 
Section 4 discusses the endogenization of land prices in 
the simulation model. Section 5 identifies the costs, 
benefits and transaction costs. The simulation results are 
presented in Section 6 Finally, the paper closes with 
conclusions and recommendations (Section 7).  
 
 
II  METHODOLOGY 
 
A consistent analytical framework for nature 
conservation decision making is essential. Cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) provides such a framework, by 
projecting a stream of costs and benefits associated with 
different policy decisions. The costs and benefits are 
expressed in monetary terms and made comparable by 
transforming them in present values.  In a more detailed 
analysis distributional issues (over persons and space), 
risk attitudes, and non-market valuations can be 
incorporated. The aim of our methodology is to provide 
a transparent framework in which different policy 
options can be compared on common economic criteria, 
usually net present monetary value. 
Economic efficiency is at the core of CBA, with a 
policy increasing economic efficiency if the sum of 
benefits to those who gain exceed the sum of costs to 
those who lose (Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle; 
Jongeneel and Koning, 1996). Implicit in this 
framework is that government intervention should be 
only undertaken if the total benefits of the intervention 
or policy change exceed its total costs. Advantages of 
the CBA approach are its ability to aggregate impacts 
from various sources into one monetary measure of net 
benefits, its provision of a transparent overview of the 
economic implications of a policy (therewith providing 
an instrument to improve accountability), its provision 
of consistent framework for data collection, and the 
identification of gaps in knowledge and uncertainties 
(Kopp, 1997). The method has also some drawbacks. A 
considerable amount of information is required, which 
can be hard to collect or recover (e.g. valuation of non-
market goods and measurement of non-exchange 
values). Moreover, focusing on one single criterion, 
economic efficiency, may be too narrow for applications 
aimed at achieving nature conservation targets (benefits 
are more difficult to measure and to value than costs, 
besides quantity issues quality issues play an important 
role). 
As mentioned before, the standard CBA-approach 
does not account for transaction costs.  However, 
different policies imply different transaction costs of 
enacting, implementing, organizing and monitoring. The 
omission of transaction costs may therefore result in the 
design and implementation of sub-optimal institutional 
arrangement (cf. Falconer and Saunders, 2002: 158). 
Public and private transaction costs must be analysed in 
relation to the policy objective and in the context of 
their achievement. Well-designed and implemented 
administrative activities, organizational procedures, etc. 
may be crucial for the success of nature conservation 
policies. Recognizing that transaction costs might have 
a productive function, however, at the same time these 
costs should be taken into account if decisions are to be 
made to maximise economic efficiency in resource 
allocation (Falconer et al., 2001: 99). Yet, hardly 
anybody has so far made a comprehensive attempt to 
include these into the analysis of nature conservation 
policies. In this paper an attempt is made to explicitly 
include the transaction costs into the analysis. 
Moreover, within CBA often a small project-assumption 
is made, which justifies treating prices as fixed. 
However, nature conservation policies might affect the 
land market, which creates a need for endogenizing the 
land market. 
With respect to transaction costs a distinction can 
be made to the supply side of nature conservation 
practices on land and the demand side. Transaction 
costs can be included in a demand and supply 
framework (cf. Bovenberg, 2002: 535). With respect to 
the supply side we suppose that farmers or other private 
landowners offer nature conservation on a contract-basis 
and the government demands for such contracts. The 
contract is the transaction or co-ordination mechanism. 
If by concluding a contract the farmers impose a private 
transaction cost of x on themselves, it is efficient to 
conclude such a contract only if the gains from 
participating (d – s) exceed these transaction costs (see 
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Figure 1, supply side). In the absence of transaction 
costs the market equilibrium is given by E, and the 
associated transactions are given by qE. The impact of 
non-zero transaction costs is that they lead to a 
provision shortage of the good. With transaction costs 
the equilibrium quantity is qT  rather than qE .All points 
in between qT  and qE yield a positive gross surplus, 
which is however not sufficient to cover the transaction 
costs. At the margin qT the gross surplus pd – ps exactly 
offsets the transaction costs. The transaction costs can 
thus be measured analogous to a tax distortion, with the 
total transaction costs amounting rectangle ABCD in 
Figure 1. Besides this rectangle, the economic or 
efficiency costs also include the Harberger triangle 
BCE, which represents the loss of surplus due to 
transactions that are crowded out by the implicit tax 
wedge x. It is also possible to redraw the supply curve 
(see dotted line in Figure 1, panel a) including the 
transaction costs. This supply curve then expresses 
supply as a function of the price, corrected for the 
transaction costs.    
    
Figure 1. Demand and supply of contracts and transaction 
costs (Source: Bovenberg  (2002: 535) adapted) 
 
With respect to the demand side a similar reasoning 
can be made (see Figure 1, demand side). Here the 
public transaction costs can be thought of as the 
organizational costs (overhead, contract design, 
bargaining cost) and costs of bureaucracy involved in 
generating the demand for nature conservation. Often it 
can be represented by a mark-up on the (labour) inputs 
used in the governance structure for realising nature 
conservation. These public transaction costs y can be 
simply modelled as a wedge between pd’ – ps’, in a way 
analogous as was done at the supply side. Likewise on 
the supply side, also here the demand curve can be 
redrawn to include the transaction costs. Similar as with 
respect to the supply side, also with respect to the 
demand side the presence of non-zero transaction costs 
imply the demand to be underestimated. The public 
transaction cost amount A’B’C’D’ and the efficiency 
costs are equal to A’B’C’. 
Summarizing, transaction costs can thus be 
incorporated into the CBA framework in an analogous 
way as price distortions (e.g. Zerbe and Bellas, 2006). 
In that case, instead of market prices, shadow prices 
have to be used, which correct the market value for its 
deviation from the social value.  
 The process of creating nature within the EMS 
can be distinguished in different phases, such as for 
example policy design, the purchase of land and the 
conversion of the purchased land into nature, or the 
reliance on contracting out and involvement of third 
parties in he management of nature. In general the 
coordinating and connecting of different phases 
involves transaction costs1. Based on the different 
phases in nature creation and the way 
of contracting out by the government 
(cf. Hart et al, 1997: 1127-1161) the 
following institutional arrangements 
are distinguished: (1) in-house 
production by the government 
(purchasing and converting 
agricultural land into nature and 
management by government 
agencies); (2) purchasing and 
converting land into nature by the 
government and management by 
private nature conservation 
organisations (NCOs); (3) nature 
management by private persons; (4) 
nature management by farmers.  
 
 
III  DESCRIPTION OF THE ECOLOGICAL 
MAIN STRUCTURE 
 
Since the 1960s of the last century there is growing 
attention among the people and in politics for 
restructuring and conservation of nature areas. In the 
1980s the Dutch government started to develop new 
nature areas by purchasing agricultural land and 
converting it to different types of nature. According to 
the island theory of McArthur and Wilson (1963), the 
                                                     
1
 Part of what we call transaction costs is labeled in Peirce et al (2006, 76) as 
regulatory and compliance costs. 
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number of species increases if different populations of 
the same species that were separated by each other by 
scattering of nature, make contact again. Based on this 
theory the scattered nature areas should be expanded 
and connected in a network of areas where flora and 
fauna have priority. The Netherlands created such a 
network, known as the Ecological Main Structure 
(EMS). The EMS was introduced in 1990 in the Nature 
Policy Plan (“Natuurbeleidsplan”) of the Dutch Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature and Food quality. The 
programme of buying agricultural land and converting 
in nature is to be finished in 2018. The EMS exists of: 
• Existing nature areas, nature reserves and nature 
development areas, robust connections areas and 
wetland  nature;  
• Agricultural areas with possibilities for agricultural 
nature preservation (nature management 
agreements areas). 
• Large water surfaces (e.g. the coastal zone of the 
North Sea, the IJsselmeer and the Waddenzee). 
 
In 1990 we had about 450 thousand ha of nature 
area. The Netherlands has a total area of about 3.5 
million ha of land of which about 60% is used for 
agriculture; and 13 % of the area was nature. The target 
of the nature policy plan (LNV, 1990) was to add 275 
thousand ha of nature for the EMS in the year 2018, i.e. 
an increase of the nature area to about 20 %. Part of this 
is to be realised by purchasing agricultural land and 
converting it into nature. In the original plan about 50 
thousand ha agricultural land for nature development 
and 100 thousand ha agricultural land for nature 
reserves were planned to purchase. Besides it 100 
thousand ha agricultural land 
were destinated for agricultural 
nature management (Bredenoord 
et al., 2004: 52). Later on 
purchasing agricultural land for 
realising robust nature 
connections zones and wetland 
nature were added to this plan, 
both together about 20,000 ha. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the 
total area involved.   
 
However, the initial plans 
had to deal with time 
inconsistency of the government. 
In the government coalition 
agreement of 1998 the target area 
for new nature of 150,000 ha was 
reduced by 19,000 ha to 131,000 
ha. Instead of purchasing the 19,000 thousand ha, the 
government targets for long term nature conservation 
contracts with private landowners were increased. The 
remaining 131,000 ha still would have to be purchased. 
Of this, about 62,000 ha of land, which is (to be) 
converted into nature for the EMS, has already been 
purchased (Bredenoord et al., 2004: 52).  The 
government coalitions of Balkenende I (2002) and II 
(2003) brought into a further policy change. The 
government would like to buy less land and making 
more use of nature conservation by private landowners 
and farmers (AES). It means again a shift in the 
institutional arrangements for realising new nature.  The 
latest target for number of hectares to be purchased for 
new nature in the EMS is 112,000 ha. In Table 1 this is 
indicated as reserves and nature development. Because 
of the cut in the target for purchasing, the target for 
private nature conservation in the EMS was increased in 
2003 to 42,000 ha, to be completed in 2018. Private 
landowners, who participate in a contract for private 
nature management receive on average a compensation 
of € 1,700 per ha per year during 30 years (or a single 
compensation of € 27,500 per ha) for the devaluation of 
their land value. Besides, they get a one-off 
compensation for developing their agricultural land in 
nature or forest and an yearly compensation for nature 
management. 
 
 
IV  LAND MARKET: ENDOGENOUS 
PURCHASING PRICE OF LAND 
 
Table 1.Targets for EMS nature policy  
Type of terrain Total 
surface 
 Purchasing, 
conversion, 
delivery 
 Agricultural 
nature 
conservation 
 Private 
nature 
conservation 
 Surface in ha 
Existing nature terrain 455,000       
Reserves and nature 
development 150,000  112,000  5,000  
 
34,000 
 
Agricultural areas with nature 
value within the EMS 90,000    90,000   
Robust connections zones  27,000  16, 000  1,500  4,000 
Robust connections zones 2nd 
round     1,500  4,000 
Existing wetland nature 3,500       
To be purchased wetland 
nature 3,000  3,000     
TOTAL 728,500  131,000  98,000  42,000 
Source: Bredenoord et al. (2004:18) 
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Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of land purchases during 
the recent past, as well as the specified targets and their 
revisions. As  Figure 2 shows, even with the adjusted 
targets the annual amount of land purchases should be 
significantly increased, as compared to the historical 
pattern. Given the scarcity of land in the Netherlands it 
is unlikely that these increased land purchases will have 
no impact at (future) land prices, and therefore land 
price was made endogenous in the analysis. 
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Figure 2. Land purchases for nature 
 
Purchased area between 1990 and 2003 (full line), projected area at current 
purchasing rate between 2004 and 2015 (dotted line), target for purchasing in 
1990, and targets adjusted in 1998 and 2003 
 
Different studies about the land market indicate the 
effect of government purchases on the land price. The 
purchasing of land for the EMS is a substantial part of 
the total purchasing of land by the government. The 
purchasing rate needs to double almost, compared to the 
average between 1991 and 2003, from 3300 to about 
6000 ha per year between 2004 and 2015 in order to 
reach the target. This will cause an increased demand 
for land on the market. Moreover, in the past relatively 
cheap land was purchased, which means that there is 
less land available for purchasing in the lower price 
classes.  
In order to trace the effects of land purchasing by 
the government for the EMS, an econometric analysis 
was done. The land price was estimated as a function of 
a price index of agricultural products, the purchasing of 
land for the EMS and the delayed land price. Different 
specifications were used, among which the use of 
variables in levels and growth rates. We also looked at 
real and nominal variables (correction for inflation with 
price index consumption). We selected the equation that 
explained the explosive price developments in the 
second half of the nineties of the last century.  
The effect of prices for agricultural products 
appeared to be little and mostly not significant. Other 
studies mentioned that the land price developments 
cannot be explained within the agricultural sector alone. 
This is being confirmed by our analysis and therefore 
the price developments in agriculture are being taken 
into account separately. Based on this empirical analysis 
the following simplified land price relation was used: 
 
tEMStltl gpp ,1,, 27.08.0 ⋅+⋅= −   
 
where p is the land price and g is the purchasing of land 
for the EMS (both variables are measured in percentage 
change; other variables suppressed; R2 0.49; estimation 
period 1991-2003). This relation was used for making 
the land price endogenous. 
 
 
V  IDENTIFICATION OF COSTS, BENEFITS 
AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
The EMS is a complicated programme. In this case 
study we estimate the costs and benefits as detailed as 
possible. Table 2 provides an illustrative overview of 
the (main) elements taken into account in the economic 
cost benefit analysis. Note that part of the costs 
associated with nature provision are transaction costs, 
which are included in entries like C, E, G and I. An 
important reason to conserve nature is for their non-
marketable benefits, which are due to lack of reliable 
valuation data not explicitly accounted for in this 
analysis. Whereas for the economic cost benefit analysis 
the government expenditure on land purchases is 
considered as a transfer, and therefore cancels out 
(Innes et al, 1998: 37). In the financial analysis, which 
focuses here on the government budget perspective, this 
expenditure will be taken into account. The allocation 
loss is related to the deadweight or efficiency losses 
associated with government intervention (e.g. the 
triangles in Figure 1). Here this mainly consists of the 
social costs of public funds (Innes et al, 1998, 39-40; 
Jongeneel, 2000).  
Table 3 summarizes the components of public 
transaction costs for nature conservation in the 
Netherlands. Following Falconer et al. (2001: 87) we 
distinguish 3 main categories of transaction costs: (1) 
information (e.g. surveying of designated areas and 
designing the prescriptions); (2) contracting (e.g. 
promotion of contracts and administrating contracts); 
(3) policy evaluation (e.g. enforcement of compliance 
and environmental monitoring). These costs can be 
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fixed at the scheme or program level, or vary with the 
number of participants. Falconer et al (2001: 97) 
emphasized the existence of administrative economies 
of size related to scheme participation. Generally it is 
the case that the lower the rate of change in participation 
over time, the lower the transaction costs. Similarly, the 
less frequent new agreements need to be established the 
lower are the transaction costs. Designating areas and 
designing prescriptions are fixed at the level of the 
scheme whereas monitoring varies with the level of 
participants. 
 
Table 2: Illustrative scheme of social costs and benefits 
associated with nature policy 
 
In this paper only public transaction costs are 
explicitly accounted for. They are mainly based on 
primary sources, in our case  interviews among experts, 
and secondary sources such as reports of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality (LNV 2004a; 
2004b), and Hilhorst et al. (2003).   
 
Table 3. The public transaction costs per hectare per year for 
different institutional arrangements 
* Actually land is not purchased but owners get a compensation when the 
value of their land decreases as a consequence of converting it from 
agricultural land into nature. 
 
Table 3 shows that the public transaction costs per 
hectare  differ over institutional arrangements.  
Remarkable are the high public transaction costs for 
purchasing and converting agricultural land in nature. 
An important reason for this is the involvement of 
different government agencies which results in a chain 
of principal/agent relationships. Table 3 makes clear 
that the transaction costs for all the phases of nature 
preservation for the institutional arrangement ‘in-house 
production by the government’ are higher or at least 
equal to the other institutional arrangements. However, 
the transaction costs for the institutional arrangement 
‘in-house production by the government’ only consists 
of public transaction costs, while the other institutional 
arrangements also have to deal with private transaction 
costs.               
It must be pointed out that the average transaction size 
(measured in hectare of land) within each institutional 
arrangements is different. This implies e.g. that although 
the contracts for agricultural nature management and 
private nature management are for a large part 
comparable, the 
transaction costs per 
hectare for private 
nature management 
are lower due to the 
larger contract size 
(15 hectare versus to 
5 hectare for 
agricultural nature 
conservation).( 
Furthermore, in 
comparison to 
contracts with other parties, the institutional 
arrangement between the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature and Food Quality and the State Forest Service 
concerns a much larger area because it is an 
arrangement on the aggregated level. The costs in Table 
3 are assumed to be yearly costs, which are assumed to 
grow with 2% per year. 
 
 
VI  RESULTS 
 
Results for four different 
scenario’s are presented 
(see Table 4). The baseline 
is the scenario where it is 
being assumed that the 
actual targets as initially planned will be reached. 
Scenario A is similar to scenario, but now it includes the 
impact of public transaction costs. Scenario B assumes 
the government purchases 3300 hectares of land per 
year until 2015. This follows the past trend and was the 
average amount of land that was purchased between 
1991 and 2003. An amount of only 98,000 ha of land 
will be purchased. In scenario C there will be more 
private and agricultural nature conservation in such a 
way as to achieve a similar total hectare target as was 
Costs  Benefits  
Lost production associated with previous land use 
(agriculture) (opportunity costs of land) 
A Non-marketable benefits of nature areas B 
Costs associated with planning and transformation 
into nature  
C Marketable benefits nature production 
 
D 
Maintenance and preservation costs (operational 
costs) 
E Net production created by production 
factors freed from their previous use in 
agriculture 
F 
Lost non-marketable benefits associated with 
previous land-use  
G Net contribution from EU funding  H 
Costs associated with nature management by third 
parties (agriculture, forest-owners) 
I Allocation losses AL 
Total S Total S 
Institutional arrangements  
 
Activity 
 
In-house 
production (State 
Forest Service) 
Nature Monuments 
and Provincial 
Landscapes 
Private nature 
management 
Agricultural 
nature 
management 
Purchase of  land 1774 1774     170* - 
Converting land 318 318 318 - 
Managing nature 76 12 27 70 
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initially planned. Two thirds goes to private and one 
thirds to agricultural nature conservation. More 
specifically, the target for becomes 64,000 ha private 
nature conservation ha and 109,000 ha agricultural 
nature conservation. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Results of the different scenarios *) 
*) The discount rate used was 4%, whereas the time horizon was the thirty 
year period 1990-2020. 
 
Landpurchases and landmarket 
As regards the land purchase, Table 4 shows that the 
reduced land purchases in scenarios B and C imply that 
the average price per hectare the government has to pay 
is 50339€/ha, which is €10590/ha less (-17%) as 
compared to the baseline. As a consequence of this the 
net present value of the expenditures on land purchases 
are reduced by nearly 40 percent. These results 
emphasize the need to take the impacts of government 
purchases on the land market equilibrium into account. 
 
If the target is not reached and the purchasing rate is 
equal to the average purchasing rate between 1991 and 
2003 (scenario B), the financial burden will be much 
lower (-26%) than in case the initial target is reached 
(see scenario A). This is mainly due to the relatively 
small amount of land that is purchased and the lower 
land price increase. The economic costs are also 
considerably lower. This is mainly due to the decreased 
spending of tax money, as a consequence of which the 
excess burden also diminishes. Also the transaction 
costs (involved in land purchases) are lower.  
 
Transaction costs 
Table 5 shows a further decomposition of costs into the 
financial costs, the public transaction costs and the 
increase of financial costs due to the transaction costs of 
the used institutional arrangements within baseline 
scenario A. As Table 5 shows the institutional 
arrangement in-house production has the highest public 
transaction costs. This can be explained by the relative 
large number of 
transactions: buying 
agriculture land, 
converting the land in 
nature, the delivery of 
land to SFS, and nature 
management and the 
numbers of hectares. 
These transactions 
imply the involvement 
of different government 
agencies which results 
in a chain of 
principal/agent 
relationships. The 
transaction costs in 1) 
and 2) differ from 3) 
and 4) because 
agricultural land is not 
purchased and converted in nature.  
 
 
Table 5. The total financial costs and the transaction costs of 
the four institutional arrangements  within  Scenario A (million 
€) 
Institutional 
arrangement 
Total 
financial 
cost 
 
Public 
transaction 
costs  
Increase in 
financial costs 
due to 
transaction 
cost (%)  
1) In-house production:  
SFS (purchasing land, 
converting land and 
managing nature) 
2310 162 7.0 
2) NCOs (purchasing 
land, converting land 
and managing nature) 
2264 119 5.2 
3)Private nature 
conservation 
(converting land and 
managing nature) 
504 63 12.5 
4) Agricultural nature 
management (AES) 
511 97 19.1 
Total 5589 442 7.9 
 
Description / scenario Baseline A B C 
Target number of hectares (1000 ha)     
Hectares to purchase for the EMS 131000 131000 98000 98000 
Hectares for private nature management 42000 42000 42000 64000 
Hectares for agricultural nature management 98000 98000 98000 109000 
Land market (€/ha)     
Expenditure for purchasing of land 3484 3669 2327 2327 
Average price of land  60929 60929 50339 50339 
Compensation paid to landowners for value 
land 
287 333 333 503 
Net present values CBA (million €)     
Total economic costs 3798 3978 3210 3498 
Total financial burden 5589 6031 4478 4813 
Total transaction costs 0 442 386 423 
    Percentage share  7.3 8.6 8.7 
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Increased reliance on private sector including 
agriculture 
In Scenario C the government by contracting out relies 
more on private and agricultural nature management to 
achieve its nature policy targets. Here, the financial 
costs are 4,813 million euros, i.e. 19% lower than those 
in scenario A. Substitution of different types of nature 
management can be an option for the government, 
especially if this gives the possibility to cut the amount 
of land to be purchased. However, the substitution 
between different types of management should 
guarantee that the quality of the nature is the same. 
 
VII  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The total net economic costs of the EMS are 3,978 
billion euro (see scenario A). This is 14,651 euro per 
hectare (present value) or about €250 per hectare per 
annum. So the societal valuation of the EMS should be 
at least €250 per hectare per year for the benefits to 
outweigh the costs. Of this costs public transaction costs 
amount 4.7% (present value €687/ha, or €11.8 per 
hectare per annum). The financial burden for the 
government of the EMS is 6,031 billion euro (including 
public transaction costs) or €22,214 per hectare.  
Relative to scenario A scenario C (with the reduced in-
house production completely being compensated by 
increase private and agricultural nature management) 
saves the government €1,219 million (net financial 
burden) and also reduces the net economic cost with 
€480 million (-17%). This is mainly due to the lower 
excess burden because of the lower amount of necessary 
public means in scenario C.  Assuming the quality of 
nature will be equal in scenario A and C, scenario C is 
more efficient in reaching the same. 
Adding public transaction costs into the CBA leads 
to higher financial and economic costs (+€442 million 
or +7.9%). Transaction costs represent significant 
amounts and therefore need to be taken into account in 
CBAs of nature policy. Moreover, if nature policies 
include large scale land purchases the land market need 
to be endogenized for otherwise contracting out 
alternatives will get an unfair treatment.  
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